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Abstract
Recent studies indicate that emotional processes, mediated by the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC), are of great
importance for moral judgment. Neurological patients with VMPC dysfunction have been shown to generate increased
utilitarian moral judgments, i.e. are more likely to endorse emotionally aversive actions in order to maximize aggregate
welfare, when faced with emotionally salient personal moral dilemmas. Patients with alcohol dependence (AD) also exhibit
impairments in functions mediated by the prefrontal cortex, but whether they exhibit increased utilitarian moral reasoning
has not previously been investigated. The aim of this study was to investigate moral judgment in AD patients (n=20)
compared to healthy controls (n=20) matched by sex, age and education years. Each subject responded to a battery of 50
hypothetical dilemmas categorized as non-moral, moral impersonal and moral personal. They also responded to a
questionnaire evaluating explicit knowledge of social and moral norms. Results confirmed our hypothesis that AD patients
generated increased utilitarian moral judgment compared to controls when faced with moral personal dilemmas. Crucially,
there was no difference in their responses to non-moral or impersonal moral dilemmas, nor knowledge of explicit social and
moral norms. One possible explanation is that damage to the VMPC, caused by long term repeated exposure to alcohol
results in emotional dysfunction, predisposing to utilitarian moral judgment. This work elucidates a novel aspect of the
neuropsychological profile of AD patients, namely a tendency to generate utilitarian moral judgment when faced with
emotionally salient moral personal dilemmas.
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Introduction
Charles Darwin wrote, ‘‘Of all the differences between man and
the lower animals, the moral sense or conscience is by far the most
important’’ [1]. Even though there is an ongoing discussion
regarding how fundamental this difference actually is [2], it is
obvious that human beings have a capacity for moral reasoning
(i.e. reasoning concerning the properties of right, wrong,
permissibility, blame etc.) that goes beyond that of any other
social animal. Human morality has traditionally been a topic for
moral philosophers, but recently cognitive neuroscientists have
started to empirically investigate the psychological and neurobi-
ological processes underlying our moral judgments. In contrast to
a traditional rationalistic view of moral reasoning as a product of
conscious reasoning [3,4], these studies indicate that emotional
processes mediated by the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(VMPC), are of great importance in moral judgment [5–12].
An important inspiration for the entire field of empirical moral
psychology is a group of well known philosophical dilemmas
known as the ‘‘trolley problems’’ [13,14]. In the ‘‘switch’’
dilemma, a runaway trolley is heading towards five people laying
on the railroad tracks. The only way to stop the trolley from killing
these five people is to hit a switch, and thereby diverting the train
onto a side track where one person is laying. Thus, in doing so the
train will run over and kill one person instead of five. A contrasting
dilemma is the ‘‘footbridge’’ dilemma in which a runaway trolley
once again threatens to kill five people laying on the railroad
tracks. In this dilemma however, the only way to save five lives is
to sacrifice one person by pushing him off a footbridge down on
the tracks, thus stopping the runaway trolley. Greene and
colleagues [7] used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
to investigate the role of emotion in moral judgment, and why
people in general find it morally acceptable to sacrifice one person
to save five persons in the ‘‘switch’’ but not in the ‘‘footbridge’’
dilemma. In order to investigate this question they created two sets
of moral dilemmas entitled impersonal and personal, containing
the relevant features of the ‘‘switch’’ and ‘‘footbridge’’ dilemmas
respectively. Personal dilemmas, analogous to the ‘‘footbridge’’
dilemma, involve actions which cause serious bodily harm to a
particular person (or group), and the harm is not a result of
avoiding an existing threat. The other dilemmas involving actions
lacking these features were classified as impersonal [15]. However,
it should be noted that the nature of the distinction between
personal and impersonal dilemma has been questioned (for
discussion, see [15,16]).
Greene and colleagues [7] were the first to use fMRI to
investigate the underlying neural activity in healthy subjects when
faced with different kinds of moral dilemmas. The results showed
that contemplation of moral impersonal dilemmas led to increased
neural activity in brain areas associated with cognition: the
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 June 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 6 | e39882dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and inferior parietal lobe. In
contrast, contemplation of moral personal dilemmas produced
increased neural activity in three brain areas associated with
emotion: the posterior cingulate cortex, amygdala and the VMPC
[7,8]. However, when faced with certain kinds or moral dilemmas
these two processes are in conflict with each other, as in the ‘‘Plane
Crash’’ dilemma:
Your plane has crashed in the Himalayas. The only survivors are
yourself, another man, and a young boy. The three of you travel for days,
battling extreme cold and wind. Your only chance at survival is to find
your way to a small village on the other side of the mountain, several
days away.
The boy has a broken leg and cannot move very quickly. His chances of
surviving the journey are essentially zero. Without food, you and the
other man will probably die as well. The other man suggests that you
sacrifice the boy and eat his remains over the next few days.
Would you kill this boy so that you and the other man may survive your
journey to safety?
On the one hand the boy will die no matter what, so it is better
that two people survive instead of none (cognitive response). On
the other hand, most people experience a strong emotional
aversion towards killing and eating an innocent person (emotional
response). Greene and colleagues have proposed a ‘dual-process
theory of moral judgment’, stating that these two separate
psychological processes, cognition and emotion, determine the
outcome of our moral judgment [8]. In order to generate a
utilitarian moral judgment, the initial negative emotional response
has to be overridden by cognitive processes. This conflict reflects
not only two internal competing processes of cognition and
emotion, but also two major views in moral philosophy namely
utilitarianism and deontology respectively. Utilitarianism is the
normative consequentialist moral theory first formally stated in the
eighteenth century by the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham
[17]. The moral creed of utilitarianism is often described as
follows: One should act so as to maximise the sum of total welfare
of everyone affected by one’s actions. Deontology in contrast is
concerned with concepts such as absolute rights and states that
certain actions, e.g. killing, are inherently wrong and may never be
performed no matter the consequences [3]. Empirical studies have
showed that cognitive processes drive utilitarian moral judgments,
while deontological moral judgments on the other hand are fuelled
by emotional reactions [7,8,11,18,19].
Studies of neurological clinical populations with VMPC
dysfunction have confirmed the important role of VMPC in
moral judgment. Patients with frontotemporal dementia [20] and
patients with selective VMPC lesions [18,19] are more likely to
generate utilitarian moral judgments when faced with emotionally
salient moral dilemmas. Thus, neurological clinical populations
with impaired VMPC function have been shown to generate
increased utilitarian moral judgment. The aim of the present study
was to investigate moral judgment in a psychiatric clinical
population with impaired prefrontal function, namely patients
with alcohol dependence (AD).
AD is a chronically relapsing disorder characterized by
physiological dependence, compulsion to seek and drink alcohol
as well as loss of behavioural control, manifested as continued
intake of alcohol despite negative consequences [21]. The
prefrontal cortex (PFC), which is essential for behavioural control
(e.g. planning, motivation, attention and inhibition of impulsive
response), is functionally impaired in patents with AD [22,23].
There are several proposed neuropsychological models explain-
ing the neuropsychological profile of AD patients. The ‘frontal
lobe hypothesis’, postulating that the PFC is specifically vulnerable
to the neurotoxic effects of alcohol, has received strong empirical
support from anatomical, clinical and neuroimaging studies
[24,25]. AD patients exhibit impairments in functions associated
with activation of the PFC e.g. increased impulsivity and risky
decision making [26,27], impaired emotional facial perception
[28–30], emotional prosody perception [31] and humour process-
ing [32,33]. There is also growing evidence for similarities in
decision making between substance abusers and VMPC lesion
patients, indicating that these patients share an underlying
emotional dysfunction (for review, see [34]). For instance, a
majority of AD patients exhibit similar behavioural and physio-
logical response as VMPC lesion patients in the Iowa Gambling
Task [35–37]. The frontal lobe hypothesis is also supported by
neuroanatomical and imaging studies, indicating that chronic AD
patients have widespread structural brain changes [38]. Volume
loss of grey and white matter was observed in several parts of the
brain of AD patients, but the frontal lobes seem to be particularly
affected [38–40].
In this study we investigated moral judgment in AD patients
compared to matched healthy controls. Since previous research
has indicated that AD patients have impaired PFC function
[24,25], and also exhibit deficits in decision making similar to
VMPC lesion patients [34], we hypothesized that AD patients
would generate increased utilitarian moral judgment, similar to
patients with VMPC lesions [18,19]. Specifically, the hypothesis
was that AD patients would be more likely to generate utilitarian
moral judgments when faced with emotionally salient personal
moral dilemmas, and that this difference would be greatest for the
‘‘high-conflict’’ subgroup of personal dilemmas. We further
hypothesized that AD patients would have intact knowledge of
explicit social and moral norms, and that there would be no
difference in the responses to non-moral and impersonal moral
dilemmas.
Methods
Participants
A naturalistic sample of AD patients (n=20; all male) was
recruited from two addiction rehabilitation centres in Stockholm,
Sweden. Inclusion criteria were: 1) Age between 35–70 years; 2)
Fulfils at least 5 DSM-IV criteria for AD; 3) Alcohol free since at
least 14 days; 4) History of at least 5 years of AD; 5) Willing to give
informed consent to participate in the study. Exclusion criteria
were: 1) Fulfils DSM-IV criteria for any other substance
dependence disorder (except nicotine); 2) Fulfils DSM-IV criteria
for any other major psychiatric illness e.g. major depression,
schizophrenia or bipolar disorder; 3) History of severe head
trauma or stroke; 4) Presence of any neurological disorder e.g.
Wernicke-Korsakoff; 5) Traces of alcohol or any other psychoac-
tive substance (central stimulant amines, THC, benzodiazepines,
opioids, cocaine) on the day of the testing, confirmed by
breathalyser or urine dip test.
Healthy controls (n=20; all male) matched by sex, age and
education years were recruited through local community adver-
tisements and by word of mouth. All healthy controls went
through the same study procedure as the AD patients, and they
also performed the performed the widely used Alcohol Use
Disorder Identification Test (AUDIT) and the corresponding test
for narcotic drugs (DUDIT) to exclude alcohol and drug abuse.
One healthy subject was excluded from the study because of
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control questions (see below for further details).
Materials and Procedure
The study protocol was approved by the Regional Ethics
Review Board in Stockholm and all participants provided written
informed consent. All subjects were interviewed using the MINI-
International Neuropsychiatric Interview [33] to confirm AD and
exclude any other major psychiatric pathology. The subjects also
completed a questionnaire to screen for any exclusion criteria, a
socio-demographic questionnaire, the Montgomery-Asberg De-
pression Rating Scale (MADRS) self-assessment of depressive
symptoms [34] and the Lifetime Drinking History (LDH)
interview [35]. Sobriety was confirmed using alcohol breathalyzer
and urine dip test was used to detect any illicit psychoactive
substance.
Knowledge of explicit social and moral norms was evaluated
using 15 items (see Table 1) selected from the Moral Behaviour
Inventory used by Mendez et al. [16], originally from the Moral
Behaviour Scale [36]. Each item was presented in paper form as
follows: ‘‘How wrong is it if you’’ followed by an action e.g. ‘‘Take
the last seat on a crowded bus’’ or ‘‘Keep over-change in a store’’.
Subjects responded to each item by choosing ‘‘not wrong’’,
‘‘mildly wrong’’, ‘‘moderately wrong’’ or ‘‘severely wrong’’, on a 4-
point rating scale.
Moral judgment was evaluated using 50 hypothetical dilemmas.
The dilemmas were divided into three categories based on their
content: non-moral (n=18), moral impersonal (n=11) and moral
personal dilemmas (n=21). The non-moral dilemmas pose neutral
questions, e.g. whether to cut vegetables or boil water first when
preparing dinner. Moral impersonal dilemmas are less emotional
(e.g. keeping money found in a lost wallet) compared to moral
personal dilemmas, which are putatively more emotional in
content (e.g. throwing people off a sinking life boat). The moral
personal dilemmas were further subdivided into ‘‘low-conflict’’
(n=9) and ‘‘high-conflict’’ (n=12), based on their fast and slow
response time in healthy volunteers, respectively [15]. The battery
of dilemmas and their classification was directly adapted and
translated from Koenigs et al. [15], and the complete battery of
dilemmas is available online at: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC2244801/bin/NIHMS38394-supplement-
supplement.doc.
Each dilemma was presented to the subject through a series of
three screens of text (see the ‘plane crash’ dilemma described
above as an example). The first two screens described the scenario,
and the last one asked the subject what he would do in this
situation. The questions were all in the form of: ‘‘Would you… in
order to …?’’. In the moral dilemmas, the questions were
constructed so that ‘yes’ responses meant endorsing the proposed
utilitarian action, while ‘no’ indicated a deontological judgment.
The subjects worked through the text screens by themselves with
the space bar, and responded by pushing a ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ button
on the computer. The subjects were instructed to read the
dilemmas in their own pace, and there was no time limit on
reading the text screens describing the scenario or responding.
Response time recording started when the final screen was
presented, and response times above 35 seconds were excluded
(n=12). Two of the non-moral dilemmas called ‘‘Turnips’’ and
‘‘Reversed turnips’’ were used as control dilemmas, since they both
had an obvious correct answer i.e. preferring the greater amount
of turnips instead of the smaller by responding ‘yes’ and ‘no’
respectively. All participants responded correctly to both these
dilemmas except one healthy control who was therefore excluded
from the analysis.
Statistical Analysis
Characteristics of patients and healthy controls, including
Lifetime Drinking History data, MADRS score and average
response to the Moral Behaviour Inventory were analysed using
independent two-tailed t-tests with a=0.05. Smoking status
between groups was analysed using chi-square analysis with Yates
correction. Mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) with Group (AD,
healthy controls) as between-subject factor and Dilemma (moral,
impersonal moral, personal moral) and response type (yes, no) as
within-subject factors, was used to analyse proportion of ‘yes’
responses as well as response time. Planned comparisons between
groups regarding proportion of ‘yes’ responses as well as response
time for different types of dilemmas were analysed using t-tests.
Probabilities were two-tailed with an a-level of 0.05.
Results
Participant characteristics are described in Table 2. There was
no significant difference between AD patients and healthy controls
regarding age (t=0,768; P=0.447) or education years
(t=20.974; P=0.336). The Lifetime Drinking History interview
confirmed that the AD patients had significantly more lifetime
drinks (t=7.091; P=0.000) and lifetime drinking days (t=6.316;
P=0.000), but there was no statistically significant difference in
age of drinking onset (t=21.557; P=0.128). Also, AD patients
smoked significantly more than the healthy controls (75% vs 21%;
P=0.002).
MADRS score difference was statistically significant (t=3.385;
P=0.003) indicating that AD patients were more depressed than
healthy controls. Five of the AD patients failed to fill in the
MADRS questionnaire because of time constraints. According to
the exclusion criteria no one with major depression (screening with
MINI interview) was included in the study, but some of the AD
patients (n=6) suffered from mild depression (MADRS 12–20).
Table 1. Knowledge of explicit social and moral norms was
evaluated using 15 items from the Moral Behaviour Scale [16],
to which the subjects responded by choosing ‘‘not wrong’’,
‘‘mildly wrong’’, ‘‘moderately wrong’’ or ‘‘severely wrong’’, on
a 4-point rating scale.
How wrong is it if you…
1) Fail to keep minor promises
2) Take the last seat on a crowded bus
3) Sell someone a defective car
4) Drive after having one drink
5) Cut in line when in a hurry
6) Don’t give blood during blood drives
7) Are mean to someone you don’t like
8) Say a white lie to get a reduced faire
9) Drive out the homeless from your neighbourhood
10) Not help someone pick up their dropped papers
11) Keep over-change at a store
12) Not offer to help after an accident
13) Ignore a hungry stranger
14) Fail to vote in minor elections
15) Keep money found on the ground
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039882.t001
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episodes (n=2) and previous panic attacks (n=1). Among the
healthy controls, MINI detected cases of previous hypomanic
episodes (n=2), obsessive compulsive disorder (n=2) and panic
attacks (n=1), but no current axis 1 psychopathology. AUDIT
(mean =2.74; Cut off limit =8) and DUDIT (mean =0; Cut off
limit =6) excluded current alcohol and drug abuse among the
healthy controls.
Knowledge of explicit social norms evaluated by responses to 15
items from the Moral Behavior Inventory did not show any
significant differences between AD patients and healthy controls
(t=0.160; P=0.874).
A mixed ANOVA on response time with Group (AD, healthy
controls) as between-subject factor, and Dilemma (Non-moral,
moral impersonal and moral personal) and Response type (yes, no)
as within-subject factors revealed a statistically significant effect of
Group (F(1, 34) =9.154; P=0.05), Dilemma (F(2, 68) =17.871;
P=0.000) and Dilemma x Response type interaction (F(2, 68)
=6.520; P=0.003). Planned comparisons showed that AD
patients in general were slower to respond to all types of dilemmas
compared to healthy controls (Non-moral: 8703 vs 6332 ms,
P=0.000; Impersonal: 6694 vs 4626 ms, P=0.000; Personal:
7006 vs 5664 ms, P=0.019). Subjects in general were slower to
endorse moral personal acts (i.e. accepting the utilitarian action)
compared to refusing them (6900 vs 5855 ms; P=0.0019) while
there was no significant difference between ‘yes’ and ‘no’ response
times for the moral impersonal dilemmas (5875 vs 5365 ms,
P=0.149).
An item-based analysis of the moral dilemmas was also
performed according to McGuire and colleagues [16] where the
dependent variable was the mean response time for each
individual dilemma with Dilemma (impersonal, personal) and
Response type (yes, no) as factors. This yielded no significant
effects of Dilemma (F(1,58) =0.131, P=0.719) or Dilemma x
Response type (F(1,58) =0.111, P=0.740), and a trend toward an
effect of response type (F(1, 58) =3.124, P=0.082). After
excluding four poorly endorsed dilemmas (less than 5% endorse-
ment) we redid the subject analysis which then yielded a significant
effect of Dilemma (F(1, 34) =6.2, P=0.018) and Group (F(1, 34)
=7.129, P=0.012) and effects approaching statistical significance
for Response type (F(1, 34) =0.079) and Dilemma x Response
(F(1, 34) =3.493, P=0.070).
Figure 1 shows the proportion of ‘yes’ responses for non-moral,
moral impersonal and moral personal dilemmas. A mixed
ANOVA on the proportion of ‘yes’ responses with Group (AD,
healthy controls) as between-subject factor and Dilemma (Non-
moral, moral impersonal and moral personal) as within-subject
factor yielded a statistically significant effect of both Group (F(1,
37) =5.093; P=0.030) and Dilemma (F (2, 74) =73.386;
P=0.000), but no significant effect of the Group x Dilemma
interaction (F(2, 74) =2.489; P=0.090). Planned comparison
however showed that the AD patients were more likely than
healthy controls to respond ‘yes’, i.e. endorsing the proposed
utilitarian action, when faced with moral personal dilemmas
(t=2.350; P=0.024), but no significant difference for neither
moral impersonal (t=1.429; P=0.161) or non-moral (t=0.722;
P=0.475).
There was a statistically significant difference in response time
on low-conflict vs high-conflict personal moral dilemmas for both
Table 2. Demographic and clinical data of the 39 subjects participating in the study, with values in parenthesis referring to 1
standard deviation.
Alcohol Dependency Healthy Controls Significance
Age 56,6 (7,287) 54,8 (6,986) n.s
Education Years 12,3 (2,536) 13,1 (2,272) n.s
Abstinence (days) 81,6 (47,389)
Age of drinking onset 14,6(2,836) 15,7 (1,108) n.s
Lifetime Drinking Days 8492 (4189,731) 1982 (1659,711) P=0.000
Lifetime Drinks 113342 (63116,449) 9252 (10547,102) P=0.000
Smoking (%) 75 21 P=0.002
MADRS
1 10,9 (6,685) 4,5 (3,169) P=0.003
AUDIT
2 2,7 (1,661)
DUDIT
3 0
1) MADRS = Montgomery-Asberg Depression Rating Scale 2) AUDIT = Alcohol Use Disorder Identification Test 3) DUDIT = Drug Use Disorder Identification Test.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039882.t002
Figure 1. Moral judgments of three classes of dilemmas: non-
moral, impersonal moral and personal moral dilemmas. The
proportion of ‘yes’ responses are shown for the two groups. Alcohol
dependent patients were more likely than healthy controls to respond
‘yes’, i.e. endorsing the proposed utilitarian action, when faced with
moral personal dilemmas (P=0.024). However, no such difference was
found for non-moral (P=0.377) or impersonal moral dilemmas
(P=0.161). Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039882.g001
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(4199 vs 5962 ms; t=23.706; P=0.02). Compared to healthy
controls, AD patients gave more ‘yes’ responses when faced with
the high-conflict personal dilemmas (t=2.173; P=0.036) while
this difference exhibited a trend toward statistical significance for
the low-conflict personal dilemmas (t=1.919; P=0.063). Figure 2
shows the proportion of ‘yes’ responses, i.e. endorsements of the
proposed utilitarian action, for the moral personal dilemmas
further subdivided into low- and high-conflict. AD patients
responded equally or more utilitarian than healthy controls for
all personal moral dilemmas except one (See figure 3).
Because of the higher proportion of mildly depressive subjects
(MADRS .12) in the AD group, we performed a post hoc analysis
to determine the influence of MADRS score on utilitarian moral
judgment. A mixed ANOVA on proportion of ‘yes’ responses with
Group (Mild Depression, No Depression) as between-subject
factor and Dilemma (Non-moral, moral impersonal and moral
personal) as within-subject factor. This revealed a significant effect
of Dilemma (F(2, 64) =34.90; P=0.000), a trend toward an effect
of Group (F(1, 32) =3.28; P=0.08 ) and no significant Group x
Dilemma interaction ( F(2, 64) =1.356; P=0.265). In a post-hoc t-
test on proportion of ‘yes’ responses, study subjects with mild
depression (MADRS .12) were compared to study subjects
without mild depression (MADRS ,12). There was no difference
regarding responses to impersonal moral judgments (t=0.707;
P=0.485), but subjects with mild depression exhibited a trend
toward responding more utilitarian compared to subjects without
depression (t=1.90; P=0.066)
Discussion
The results of this case-control study of AD patients and healthy
controls confirmed the hypothesis that AD patients generate
increased utilitarian moral judgments when faced with moral
personal dilemmas, compared to healthy controls. The subjects
responded to a battery of dilemmas divided into non-moral, moral
impersonal and moral personal dilemmas (further subdivided into
low- and high-conflict), and 15 items evaluating knowledge of
explicit social and moral norms. Since AD patients exhibit
impairments in functions mediated by the PFC [25], as well as
similar decision making as VMPC lesion patients [34], AD
patients were hypothesized to generate increased utilitarian moral
judgment while having intact knowledge of explicit social and
moral norms, similar to VMPC lesion patients [18,19].
The AD patients were slower than healthy controls to respond
to the dilemmas in general, which could be explained by slower
reading pace and comprehension, or unfamiliarity with computer
administered tasks. Also, since the subjects were encouraged to ask
questions when they did not understand something in the
presented dilemma, the response time data is not optimal and
should thus be interpreted with caution. The present response time
data replicate findings from previous research employing the same
moral dilemma battery, as subjects in general were slower to
endorse moral personal acts compared to refusing them, while
there was no significant difference between ‘yes’ and ‘no’ response
times for the moral impersonal dilemmas [7,8,14]. Also, subjects
within each group responded faster to low-conflict compared to
high-conflict personal moral dilemmas, which replicates the
previous findings and confirms this subdivision of moral personal
dilemmas [15]. However, we also performed an item analysis in
which the response time was analysed across each of the different
dilemmas instead of subjects, according to previous research
criticising the original distinction between impersonal/personal
moral dilemmas [16]. This analysis yielded no significant effects,
which suggests that the observed differences in response times in
the subject analysis were driven by a small subset of dilemmas,
which questions the postulated distinction between personal and
impersonal moral dilemmas. Thus, the present response time
results should be viewed in light of the fact there are methodo-
logical problems related to the moral dilemma battery and the
subdivisions of moral dilemmas (for further discussion, see
[15,16]).
No difference was found between groups in responses to non-
moral and moral impersonal dilemmas, nor regarding knowledge
of explicit social and moral norms. This implicates that the
difference in moral judgment does not depend on a more general
decision making deficit, nor is it explained by failure to understand
social and moral norms. However, AD patients were more likely
than healthy controls to respond ‘yes’, i.e. endorsing the proposed
utilitarian act, when faced with personal moral dilemmas. This
difference was greatest for the subgroup of personal moral
dilemmas classified as ‘‘high-conflict’’, such as the ‘‘plane crash’’-
dilemma described above, where an emotionally aversive act is
required to maximize aggregate welfare. Figure 3 illustrates
responses to all individual personal dilemmas for each group,
ordered by increasing proportion of ‘yes’ responses in the healthy
control group. Our results confirm the validity of the subdivision of
personal dilemmas made by Koenigs et al. [19], regarding low-
conflict dilemmas (labelled 1–8) and high-conflict dilemmas (9–21),
as the observed difference between groups emerges more clearly in
the high-conflict dilemmas. According to the ‘dual-process theory
of moral judgment’ [8], high-conflict moral dilemmas induce a
conflict between cognition and emotion, and a utilitarian moral
judgment depends on cognitive processes overriding the emotional
response. However, in patients who suffer from emotional
dysfunction caused by VMPC dysfunction, the ‘‘high-conflict’’
dilemmas do not induce the same degree of conflict between
cognition and emotion, and thus these patients are more likely to
generate the utilitarian moral judgment [8,18,19].
The somatic marker theory stipulates that the neural substrates
responsible for homeostasis, emotion and feelings fundamentally
determine our decision-making in general [6]. Verdejo-Garcia and
Bechara [34] has proposed a ‘somatic marker theory of addiction’,
Figure 2. Moral judgments of the personal moral dilemmas,
further subdivided into low- and high-conflict respectively. The
proportion of ‘yes’ responses are shown for the two groups. Alcohol
dependent patients were more likely than healthy controls to respond
‘yes’, i.e. endorsing the proposed utilitarian action, when faced with the
high-conflict dilemmas (P=0.036), while the difference was less
pronounced for the low-conflict dilemmas (P=0.063). Error bars
indicate 95% confidence intervals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039882.g002
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between VMPC lesion and substance abuse patients, namely their
tendency to choose an immediate reward while disregarding the
long-term negative consequences. According to this view, there is a
link between the emotional dysfunction and altered decision
making in substance abusers. The present study implicates that
this is also true for complex moral decision making, since AD
patients exhibit a similar pattern of moral judgment as VMPC
lesion patients [18,19].
Conclusions regarding underlying neuronal processes determin-
ing the increased utilitarian moral judgment in AD patients cannot
be made based on this data set. However, according to the ‘frontal
lobe hypothesis’, the neuropsychological profile of AD patients
(e.g. increased impulsivity, risky decision making, impaired
emotional facial perception) is caused by specific neurotoxic
effects of alcohol on the PFC [25]. If this hypothesis is true, the
present results would indicate that the neurotoxic effects of alcohol
on the VMPC causes emotional dysfunction, which results in
increased utilitarian moral judgment to emotionally salient moral
dilemmas. However, the ‘frontal lobe hypothesis’ does not
differentiate between different functional areas of the PFC. AD
patients also show impairments of e.g. working memory, indicating
dysfunction of the dorsolateral PFC [27], which is one of the
‘cognitive’ neural areas associated with utilitarian moral judgment
according to the ‘dual process theory of moral judgment’ [7,8].
One possible explanation of the present results could be that even
though alcohol causes wide spread damage to the PFC, including
both ‘cognitive’ and ‘emotional’ areas, the aggregate effect results
in a relatively greater impairment of ‘emotional’ function when
faced with moral dilemmas. Thus, perhaps the cognitive ability to
compare 1 versus 5 lives is more preserved in AD patients,
compared to the ability to generate an emotional response when
faced with an emotionally salient moral dilemma.
Early studies of moral judgment in AD patients found no
difference between AD patients and healthy controls, evaluated by
the Kohlberg scale of moral maturity [41]. However, according to
Kohlberg the trademark of high level of moral maturity is rational
moral reasoning from explicit universal principles concerning
welfare or human rights [4]. In the present study, moral reasoning
in AD patients was by no way impaired according to the standards
of Kohlberg. Rather, AD patients exhibited a tendency toward a
more rational utilitarian way of moral reasoning, based on the
universal principle of maximizing aggregate welfare, which at least
according to utilitarian moral philosophers would be a superior
way of moral reasoning. This elucidates a novel aspect of the
neuropsychological profile of AD patients, namely a tendency
towards a more rational, but less emotional, way of moral
reasoning. This distinction is not captured by the Kohlberg scale
of moral maturity, which explains why earlier studies did not find
any difference in moral judgment between AD patients and
healthy controls. However, to what degree increased utilitarian
moral judgment is specific to AD compared to other types of
addiction, and whether this utilitarian bias translates into addiction
related behaviour, e.g. tendency to relapse despite negative
emotional consequences, remains to be answered.
This study had several limitations. Firstly, the sample size is
limited and the data should therefore be interpreted with caution
until replicated. Secondly, even though the groups were
adequately matched regarding sex, age and education years, there
was still a mismatch since AD patients had higher MADRS scores
and a higher proportion of smokers. Further, our post hoc analysis
showed that patients with mild depression (MADRS .12) showed
a trend towards more utilitarian responses compared to the
subjects without mild depression (MADRS ,12). This suggests
that depressive symptoms might constitute a confounding factor in
the present study. However, it should be noted that none of the
AD patients in our study fulfilled the DSM-IV criteria for major
depression. Furthermore, it is well known that long term drug
intake induces persistent neuroadaptations in the brain [22],
resulting in a state of increased negative affect mediated by down
regulation of reward pathways and up regulation of brain stress
circuits [42]. Thus, negative affect and depressed mood in the
Figure 3. Moral judgment on each moral personal dilemma. The proportion of ‘yes’ responses are shown for the two groups for each of the
21 moral personal dilemmas. The dilemma numbers are directly adapted from Koenigs et al. (2007) and sorted according to increasing proportion of
‘yes’ responses, i.e. endorsing the proposed utilitarian action, by the healthy controls. Dilemmas labelled 1–8 and 9–21 are low-conflict type and high-
conflict type respectively. Alcohol dependent patients responded equally or more utilitarian than healthy controls for all personal moral dilemmas
except one, and the difference in response was more pronounced for the high-conflict dilemmas (P=0.036) compared to low-conflict dilemmas
(P=0.063).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039882.g003
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Future studies are needed to further investigate the role of
depressive symptoms in moral judgment, by focusing for instance
on patients with mood disorders without co-morbid substance
abuse.
Finally, it is important to note the limitations of case-control
studies regarding the question of causality. Whether life long
alcohol intake causes an increased tendency towards utilitarian
moral judgment, or if individuals with a predisposition for
utilitarian moral judgment are more likely to develop AD, remains
unanswered. Finally, the data in this study is purely behavioural.
Thus, the discussion above regarding emotional dysfunction
related to PFC dysfunction should be viewed as speculative until
functional imaging data confirms the hypothesis. Since moral
reasoning is a complex function involving several brain areas
besides the VMPC, such as medial frontal gyrus, posterior
cingulate, superior temporal sulcus region, the temporal pole,
amygdala and dorsolateral PFC (for review see [43]), altered moral
reasoning could hypothetically result from abnormal function in
any of these other brain structures. For instance, it is well
established that addiction patients have an altered function in
several brain regions besides the PFC, e.g. the dopaminergic
mesolimbic system, amygdala and hippocampus (for review see
[22]). It is thus possible that the present finding of increased
utilitarian moral judgment in AD patients is caused by dysregu-
lation of these subcortical brain structures, rather than prefrontal
regions.
In conclusion, our results indicate that AD patients generate
increased utilitarian moral judgment when faced with emotionally
salient moral personal dilemmas. The importance of these findings
is two-fold. Firstly, they represent new evidence in support of the
‘frontal lobe hypothesis’ [25] of the neuropsychological profile in
AD patients and the ‘somatic marker theory of addiction’ [34], as
well as the ‘dual-process theory of moral judgment’ [8]. Secondly,
they increase our understanding of the neuropsychological profile
of AD patients. When faced with moral personal dilemmas, this
patient group has a propensity to generate utilitarian moral
judgment. Further research in the intersection of psychiatry and
moral psychology could improve our understanding of complex
decision making and inter-personal behaviour in psychiatric
clinical populations.
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